Philosophy of Technology: Chapter 17 (Kristin Shrader-Frechette)

"Technology and Ethics" (1992)

Background notes:

• research analyzes mathematical, biological, or ethical problems in risk assessment, public health, or
  environmental justice – especially those related to radiological, ecological, and energy-related risks
  
• this is a well-known summary of what is perhaps the most popular philosophical treatment of technology--an ethical evalutation

Reading Response:
Because of the expansion of ethical concepts as a result of new technology, Shrader-Frechette suggests that those who study technology and ethics need both technical and philosophical skills. She states that philosophical questions about technology and ethics fall into one of at least 5 categories:

1. conceptual and metaethical questions (e.g., definitions)
   
2. general normative questions (e.g., human rights/duties)
   
3. particular normative questions about specific technologies (e.g., liability)
   
4. questions about ethical consequences of technology (e.g., civil liberties, less safe regulations)
   
5. questions about ethical justifiability of various methods of technological assessment (e.g., analysis and methods assessment)

She moves on to define (a common theme/word in these readings), evaluate, and assess technological risk. In her definition, which starts with a probability of physical harm, she explains that technological risk cannot be defined purely quantitatively, and that it includes qualitative factors. (This is especially interesting to me in that it relates to tech comm research methods, and the need for quantitative and qualitative research to triangulate a study.) Shrader-Frechette points out that, to some philosophers, an equitably distributed technological risk could be more desirable that a quantitatively smaller one that is inequitably distributed.

In the same manner as Ellul, Shrader-Frechette talks about probabilistic uncertainty--because we have limited experience with these new technologies, the probability of risk or even fatality, for example, is difficult to determine. And like Ellul, she suggests that we rely on the subjective probabilities of experts, or we should assume that all probabilities are likely (negative or positive). She warns us of an "overconfidence bias"--that there will be no serious health consequences or accidents as a result of a given technology. In other words, doubt is good.

Shrader-Frechette touches on the ethical debates of due process and risk assessment. As for due process, she states that ethicists believe that technology threatens due process rights; due process is impossible for some fatalities in that the victim cannot be compensated for a death. As for risk assessment, Shrader-Frechette explains that philosophers and policy makers argue about how much risk is acceptable through classic discussions of utilitarian vs. egalitarian ethical debates. Philosophers are divided on how to evaluate negligible risks, in particular. (For example, if a new drug or therapy helps a large population of, say, cancer victims, but a few have terrible, even fatal side effects, is the drug unethical? Do we let the individual decide, or should there be some ethical standard/guideline?)

This leads us to her last point--consent to risk. If an individual consents to a drug, a risky job, or a toxic living condition, have they truly consented? Shrader-Frechette worries that people may not be adequately informed about (or compensated for--e.g. "compensating wage differentual") the risks they take on. Obviously, this is where technical communication could get involved: in helping the public make informed decisions about their consent.

Philosophy of Technology: Chapter 16 (Jacques Ellul)

"On the Aims of a Philosophy of Technology" (preface to The Technological Society, 1954, 1963, and 1964)

Background notes on Ellul:

• French philosopher, law professor, sociologist, theologian, and Christian anarchist 
• approached technology from a deterministic viewpoint
• constant concern with the emergence of a "technological tyranny" over humanity
  
• exemplifies the global, holistic approach of continental philosophers, but also denies that this makes his work either speculative or evaluative, but entirely descriptive
• deliberately avoids offering ethical and aesthetic evaluations of technology
• accuses those who read him as negative or pessimistic as simply reacting to their own prior value commitments
• describes technology as, at best, a sociological abstraction and not a real phenomenon (those who believe it is real reveal their commitment to methodological individualism) 

Reading Response:
In this preface, Ellul is concerned with explaining the goals of his book and what it will not attempt to do. He states that he is not interested in describing techniques, providing a balance sheet of technological accomplishments, or making ethical or aesthetic judgments on technique. He cannot do these things because, he believes, no one is capable of giving a true account of the total effect of technological techniques as a result of their own point of view inevitably interfering. Instead, he claims he has attempted to present a concrete and fundamental interpretation of technique, based on description only.

He starts with a definition, arrived at by examining activities and observing techniques: "technique is the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency in every field of human activity." He emphasized the sociological aspect of technique, or the effect of technique on social relationships, political structures, and economics--every factor in the life of modern man.

In focusing only on the descriptive, Ellul suggests that he should not be considered a pessimist, as readers who suggest so are making value judgements and not concerned with knowing whether things are factual or not. He insists that he is not interested in proving anything, only in performing sociological reflection (not individual action). He does not believe that the individual exerts any control over social, political, or economic mechanisms. As he sees it, individual decisions are made within a framework or collective reality, and therefore no reference to individual agency is made (even though he does acknowledge that individuals are more determined, albeit differently determined, than in the past). Ellul believes it is an illusion to think that we are free from society's taboos. Rather, we are simply conditioned by something new: technological civilization. We have simply moved from one set of determinants to another.

In response to accusations of fatalism, Ellul counters that man is only helpless if he abdicates his responsibilities by living a trivial existence by not taking a stand against these determinants in our technological civilization. However, he can only provide us with a probable evolution: he cannot know whether individuals will follow this advice, and therefore it is probable that man will not pull himself together and assert himself.

In response to accusations of pessimism, Ellul acknowledges that he has no solution to put forth, as any solution would be idealistic, fanciful, and even dishonest. He asks many questions, though, as he believes one must diagnose the problem before one can treat it. Thus his interest in a working procedure, starting with a description of the facts, which can lead to analysis and posing problems, which will finally lead to solutions.


He calls for each of us (not just scholars or experts) to seek ways to resist and transcend technological determinants. He even goes as far as to challenge the US Constitution when he states, "freedom is not an immutable fact graven in nature and on the heart of man. It is not inherent in man or in society, and it is meaningless to write into law." He insists that freedom is meaningless and only found in overcoming and transcending determinisms, representing victory over necessity. In other words, freedom is an act, not a right. We decide to be free from something. To Ellul, the first act in freeing man from the determinism of technology is by becoming aware of its essence and by the need to transcend it.

Philosophy of Technology: Chapter 15 (Mario Bunge)

"Philosophical Inputs and Outputs of Technology" (1979)

Background notes on Bunge:

• former physicist and disciple of Karl Popper (commitment to general systems theory)
• vocal participant in "Science Wars:
• opponent of Romanticism and anti-technological attitudes on philosophy
• severe critic of social constructivist and hermeneutical approaches to technology
• critical of pragmatism 

Reading Response: 
Through a metaphor on philosophical "inputs" and "outputs" (because technology is both a consumer [input] and producer [output] of philosophical ideas, Bunge states that technology is a major part of contemporary culture. As such, he believes, philosophers must pay more attention to it than ever before, attempting to define what technology includes in order to understand it. According to Bunge, technology is a field of research that "aims at the control or transformation of reality whether natural or social." In other words, pure science makes changes to achieve knowledge, while technology uses knowledge in order to provoke change.

Bunge identifies 4 branches of technology: material (physical, chemical, biochemical, and biological), social (psychological, psychosociological, sociological, economic, warfare, and futurology), conceptual (computer sciences), and general (theories). Among these branches, he states that most technological ideas are found in policy- and decision-making, and in research, allowing it to have a creative component. By comparing scientific and technological research, he finds that, while both are goal-oriented, they have different goals (scientific research seeks truth for truths sake, while technological research seeks useful truth). However, he criticizes idealistic philosophers and pragmatists for neglecting the conceptual side of technology when they focus only on its coarse, practical or material outputs.

Bunge identifies several neighbors with technology, such as industrial civilization and modern culture,  pseudoscience and pseudotechnology, mathematics, arts, and humanities. Having placed technology within these other fields, he moves on to explain what technology shares with pure science: epistemological assumptions from realism and metaphysics of science.

Epistemological assumptions:

1. there is an external world
2. the external world can be known, if only partially
   
3. every piece of knowledge can be improved upon if we care to

In this framework, he compares classical and modern technologists. (Classical = realist, but naive in that he believe what he sees to be accurate representations. Modern = realist, but critical in that he realizes that our theories are symbolic and over-simplified representations, and tempered by pragmatist attitude.)

Metaphysics of Technology:

1. the world is composed of things
2. things get together in systems (and some are isolated)
3. all things fit into objective stable laws
4. nothing comes out of nothing and nothing goes over into nothingness
5. determination is often multiple and problematic rather than simple or linear

With the use of technology, he points of the following theories:

1. man can deliberately alter natural processes
2. man can create or wipe out entire natural kinds
3. because man can control these things intellectually through the use of technology, there is a need for a philosophy of technology distinct from that of other sciences

Because technology consumes and produces its own philosophical ideas, it is imperative, in Bunge's view, to consider ethics, especially the dubious morals found in technology--uses for good and unforseen uses for evil. He lists previous maxims (guided or misguided) of the technological process, and then calls for a new ethical code of technology, one that does not condone the "dark side" of technology. Such a code should, in his view, consist of an individual (personal responsibility) and a social (policy makers) ethical code. He states that such a two-tiered code would not tolerate double ethical standards.